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I. Introduction 
Thank you so much for having me. This is such a wonderful 
conference, and I am so excited to see the area of overlap between 
tax and poverty becoming its own field of study. The fact that we 
are all here today to talk about tax and poverty is in fact just more 
evidence of the growing extent to which the federal government 
relies on tax tools to fight poverty. When using the tax code against 
poverty started, when the EITC first took root decades ago, the tax 
anti-poverty programs supplemented direct-spending programs 
like welfare and food stamps.1 As those programs have contracted, 
and as the tax antipoverty programs expanded, in terms of the 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Associate 
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School and Affiliate, Institute for 
Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thanks to Michelle Lyon 
Drumbl and the student organizers of this symposium for convening this event 
and to Chas Camic, Carey Seal and Alex Tahk for helpful comments. 
 1. See John Karl Scholz, Robert Moffitt & Benjamin Cowan, Trends in 
Income Support, in CHANGING POVERTY, CHANGING POLICIES 203–41, 232 (2009) 
(discussing historical data on social insurance and antipoverty spending by 
program in the 1970–2007 period).  
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numbers of recipients and the generosity of the relevant legislative 
provisions, the tax antipoverty provisions have become more 
important to the nation’s antipoverty agenda: Bigger in scale and 
higher in visibility.2  
The question that I want to talk about today: To what extent 
do the particular advantages of the tax antipoverty programs 
persist as the tax antipoverty programs take center stage? Can tax 
programs, once distinguished from their direct-spending 
counterparts on the grounds of relative popularity and legal and 
administrative ease of access maintain those hallmarks as the 
tax-based welfare state grows in size and scope?3 The first of the 
tax antipoverty programs was the EITC, a small, nimble program 
easily administered on a tax return, often meant to encourage 
                                                                                                     
 2. See generally Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, The Earned Income Tax 
Credit: A Brief Legislative History, Congressional Research Service, in CONG. RES. 
SERV. (Mar. 20, 2018) (“After various legislative changes over the past 40 years, 
the credit is now one of the federal government’s largest antipoverty programs. 
Since the EITC’s enactment, Congress has shown increasing interest in using 
refundable tax credits for a variety of purposes.”) For data on the EITC’s size in 
recent years relative to other federal antipoverty programs, see Karen Spar & 
Gene Falk, Federal Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: Overview 
of Spending Trends, FY2008-FY2015, in CONG. RES. SERV., 9 (July 29, 2016).  
 3.  See generally Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything is Tax, 50 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 67 (2013). For arguments about the administrative ease of programs run 
through the tax code, see id. at 101–04; Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on 
Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 829–32 (2014); Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and 
Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197, 1223 (2006); David A. Weisbach, 
Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1823, 1830–42 (2006); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration 
of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1010–12 (2004). For 
arguments about relative popularity, see Conor Clarke, New Research on the 
Stubborn Persistence of Tax Expenditures, 150 TAX NOTES 1462 (2016); Conor 
Clarke & Edward Fox, Note, Perceptions of Tax Expenditures and Direct Outlays: 
A Survey Experiment, 124 YALE L.J. 1252 (2015); Christopher Faricy & 
Christopher Ellis, Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: 
The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures, 36 POL. BEHAV. 
53 (2013); Jake Haselswerdt & Brandon Bartels, Public Opinion, Policy Tools, 
and the Status Quo: Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 68 POL. RES. Q. 607 
(2015). For further reading, see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures 
Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the 
Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 799 (2005) (finding 
that participants in a survey experiment were less likely to view property tax 
exemptions, as opposed to direct subsidies, as interfering with volunteer 
firefighters’ status as volunteers). 
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people who might otherwise be receiving welfare to go to work.4 
Now, the EITC at the foundation of our federal antipoverty 
apparatus.5 What are the consequences? How much have the EITC 
and its now-lengthy list of companion tax antipoverty programs, 
retained the advantages of the supplemental welfare state it once 
was? Or, instead, are the tax antipoverty programs starting to 
resemble the behemoth direct-spending programs they’ve replaced 
in the center of the U.S.’s social policy landscape? To what extent 
can we expect tax programs become more like direct-spending 
programs, or “welfare” over time? That’s the question I want to 
consider in this talk: Will the trajectories of the tax antipoverty 
programs and the direct-spending programs converge? 
My goal here to take seriously potential threats that emerge 
from relying on the tax code as the primary federal means to 
accomplish antipoverty goals? To talk about this question, I want 
to focus on three ways that tax antipoverty programs have differed 
from their direct-spending counterparts and consider how each 
might change as the tax programs grow in scale and salience. First, 
I will discuss public opinion, second, legal frameworks, namely the 
fact that the tax programs are in the Internal Revenue Code and 
the non-tax ones are not, and third, administration. I will then 
offer a few concluding reflections on the normative implications of 
these differences and their possible persistence. 
II. Public Opinion 
First, I want to look the relative popularity of the tax 
antipoverty programs. In my past work, I’ve written about the 
growing body of evidence that tax antipoverty programs are 
substantially more popular than their direct-spending 
counterparts.6 A commenter on a paper of mine one said that 
                                                                                                     
 4. See Crandall-Hollick, supra note 2, at 2–4 (discussing the various 
characteristics of the EITC). 
 5. See Spar & Falk, supra note 2, at 9 (characterizing the EITC as one of 
the federal government’s “top four” programs for people with low incomes). 
 6. See Tahk (2014), supra note 3, at 829–32 (“While conventional wisdom 
might suggest that the poor do not know to file tax returns and for that reason 
miss out on available benefits, data reveal that the take-up rates, at least for the 
EITC, are substantially higher than for nontax welfare programs.”); see also 
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tax-based anti-poverty programs are “statism for anti-statists;” 
they take something unpopular: Welfare, and repackage it in the 
anti-statist trappings of tax benefits.7 In this way, they make 
welfare policy more palatable to the public, to political leaders and 
to beneficiaries.8 We see this in both what has happened to the tax 
antipoverty programs and the way people view them, each of which 
I will now discuss. 
What has happened: The tax anti-poverty programs continue 
to be popular enough with political elites so as to enable their 
growth. Most recently, take the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, passed by 
two Republican-controlled houses of Congress and signed by 
President Trump.9 While not enhancing the EITC, the bill did not 
cut it, either, and of course did substantially expand the child tax 
credit,10 including lowering the earned income threshold.11 In fall 
2018 in Wisconsin, a new child credit was one of the signature 
plans in the midterm election from Republican governor, Scott 
Walker.12 
                                                                                                     
Clarke supra note 3, at 1463–64(discussing how “[t]he public consistently prefers 
spending through the tax code to spending outside of it”); Clarke & Fox, supra 
note 3, at 1279–82 (discussing “some limitations and hypotheses that we hope will 
provide a basis for future research on why taxpayers prefer spending through the 
tax code”); Faricy & Ellis, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing “why citizens support or 
oppose particular social spending programs”); Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 
3, at 615–19 (discussing an “experimental study [that] makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of citizen preferences regarding government 
programs”). 
 7. Thanks to Ajay Mehrotra for this point. 
 8. Thanks to Ajay Mehrotra for this point. 
 9. For votes on this bill, see 163 CONG. REC. H10214 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 
2017); 163 CONG REC. S8141–42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2017). For President Trump’s 
signing statement, see Remarks by President Trump at Signing of H.R. 1, Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Bill Act, and H.R. 1370 (Dec. 22, 2017), available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-
signing-h-r-1-tax-cuts-jobs-bill-act-h-r-1370/. 
 10. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”) § 11022(a), I.R.C. § 24 (2018) 
(increasing and modifying the child tax credit). 
 11. See id. (same) 
 12. See Walker Proposes New Child Tax Credit, WIS. RADIO NETWORK (Sep. 
24, 2018), https://wsau.com/news/articles/2018/sep/24/walker-proposes-new-
child-tax-credit/ (discussing Scott Walker’s “proposal to provide a new child care 
tax credit) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
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On the subject of public opinion, a spate of published studies 
in the past few years has consistently found that people are more 
likely to support tax-embedded social programs than their non-tax 
counterparts.13 Researchers have found this to be true across policy 
areas.14  
The question on the public opinion side then becomes, to what 
extent will the tax credits remain relatively popular as they 
become more central to the country’s antipoverty agenda? Welfare 
and other direct-spending programs were historically unpopular,15 
which is perhaps one reason why we do not have Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children anymore,16 and may be part of why 
enrollment in these programs continues to decline.17 Can we expect 
the same thing to happen to the tax antipoverty programs? 
 The answer to that depends on why the tax antipoverty 
programs were relatively popular in the first place. Unfortunately, 
we do not yet have much empirical evidence to help us sort this 
out. I want to talk a bit about my different hypotheses and what 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 1463–64 (discussing why “[t]he public 
believes tax expenditures are cheaper than equivalent spending program”); 
Clarke & Fox, supra note 3, at 1279–82 (discussing why taxpayers prefer 
spending through the tax code); Faricy & Ellis, supra note 3, at 70–71 (“Both 
Republicans and Democrats support the mortgage interest and retirement 
programs less when they are framed as direct payments rather than tax credits.”); 
Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 3, at 615–19 (discussing the data pertaining 
to why taxpayers prefer spending through tax programs). 
 14. See Clarke & Fox, supra note 3, at 1277–78 (finding this preference in 
the case of homeownership subsidies); Faricy & Ellis, supra note 3, at 64 (finding 
it in the case of retirement-saving and homeownership subsidies); Haselswerdt & 
Bartels, supra note 3, at 612 (finding it in the case of homeownership, 
parental-leave and job-training subsidies). 
 15. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 26 (1999) 
(explaining data that “support the popular impression that Americans are 
uniquely hostile toward, or at least uniquely unsupportive of, government 
responsibility for social welfare”).  
 16. See id. at 24–25 (discussing the influence of public opinion on 
development of the welfare state). 
 17. See Gene Falk, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, in CONG. RES. SERV. 5 (Jan. 
28, 2019) (analyzing “a long-term historical perspective on the number of families 
receiving assistance from TANF or its predecessor program, from July 1959 to 
September 2017”). 
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each implies for the potential future trajectory of the tax-based 
welfare state. I will call them hypotheses A, B and C. 
Hypothesis A is about work. It says, the tax antipoverty 
programs are relatively more popular than their direct-spending 
counterparts because the tax programs involve work. The tax 
antipoverty programs either are explicitly linked to earned 
income,18 or have earned income thresholds19 or, in the case of more 
indirect tax antipoverty programs like the low-income housing 
credit, they are for business taxpayers who presumably have tax 
liability against which to offset the credits.20 When I present data 
on the tax program’s public-opinion advantage, the fact that tax 
antipoverty programs require recipients to work is probably the 
hypothesis is always the first one that audiences suggest. 
However, that story has to be a little more complicated, 
especially now that the tax benefits’ relative place in the 
antipoverty landscape is changing. Lots of direct-spending 
antipoverty programs including temporary assistance to needy 
families21 and food stamps do now explicitly mandate work,22 and 
                                                                                                     
 18. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21(a)(1) (2018) (requiring that expenses eligible for the 
child care credit be “employment-related”); see also, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(1), 
(c)(2)(A) (2018) (specifying that the EITC requires earned income and then 
defining earned income as income from work). 
 19.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 24(d)(1)(B)(i) (2018), (h)(6) (2018) (setting the 
refundability threshold, then lowering it from $3000 to $2500 for the years 2018–
2025). 
 20. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 38 (b)(6), (10) (14) (2018) (identifying the low-income 
housing credit, the empowerment zone employment credit and the new markets 
tax credit as parts of the general business credit, which is nonrefundable and, by 
definition, only able to be offset against tax liability). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (explaining the requirements for an 
individual in a 2-parent family to be considered as engaged in work for a month 
for a fiscal year). 
 22. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-193, § 815, 110 Stat. 2278 (amending sec. 6(d) of the Food 
and Agriculture Act of 1977 to disqualify from receiving food stamps able-bodied 
adults without dependents who refuse to register for employment, participate in 
an employment or training program, or accept an offer of employment). In 
addition, many states have additional work requirements for food stamp 
recipients. For instance, six states disqualify the entire household from receiving 
food stamps if the head of household fails to comply with work requirements. See 
Snap Work Requirements Fact Sheet, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/snap-work-requirements-fact-
sheet.aspx#2018%20Legislation (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (analyzing 2018 state 
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have for more than 20 years.23 While the EITC has earned income 
in its name, I am not sure how many people know that the child 
tax credit has an implicit work requirement in the form of the 
earned income threshold. Further, at this point, the threshold is 
low enough that it is a much less stringent work provision than the 
direct-spending programs have.24 Commentators might reply, 
people think the tax programs lean more heavily on work rules 
than welfare does. The public may think that, but the fact that it 
is not true anymore just raises the question, what is it about the 
tax programs that makes the public think they necessarily require 
work? And more importantly for this talk, would people keep 
thinking that if, for instance, Congress did lower the earned 
income threshold of the child tax credit to five dollars, or to 0? Will 
people always associate tax-embedded social policy with work? 
How non-work-oriented can the tax credits become without losing 
their work halo? If strong work associations are what makes the 
tax antipoverty programs particularly popular, how enduring that 
popularity will be would depend on how strong those associations 
are, and whether they can withstand the potential decreasing 
relative importance of work to some of the tax programs. 
                                                                                                     
legislation regarding work requirements) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 23. See the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, P.L. 104-193, 
110 Stat. 2105, (setting up TANF and adding work requirements for food stamps; 
was passed on August 22, 1996). 
 24. An earned income threshold means that the recipient of the credit must 
have at least $2,500 of earned income to take the credit. To see how this 
calculation works, see Conf. Rept. No. 108-696 P.L. 108-311, 34; Conf. Rept. No. 
107-84. P.L. 107-16, 133. Current SNAP law requires, in essence, able-bodied 
adults to work 30 hours a week or enroll in a comparable work training program 
or school. See Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 4001–4407 
(describing the Food Stamp Program and its requirements); see also 7 C.F.R. 
§ 273.24 (same). For a summary of these requirements, see United States Dep’t. 
of Agric., Food and Nutrition Service, in SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM— CLARIFICATIONS ON WORK REQUIREMENTS, ABA WDs, and E&T (May 
2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Clarifications-on-
WorkRequirements-ABAWDs-ET-May2018.pdf (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). At the federal minimum wage of 
$7.25/hour, the earned income threshold of $2,500 amounts to a requirement that 
the child credit recipient work only 7 hours a week. In addition, none of the SNAP 
law about what counts as work, or whether this work get done over the course of 
a year or in a few weeks, applies to the child credit, which merely requires the 
recipient to earn $2,500, however the person would like to do it. 
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My second hypothesis as to why the tax anti-poverty programs 
are relatively popular, Hypothesis B, posits tax programs are 
relatively popular because they are framed as tax cuts, as reducing 
people’s taxes. The story of hypothesis B goes: Conventional 
wisdom holds that taxes are not popular,25 so anything that 
purports to lower tax burdens gains a public opinion advantage. 
That advantage would among both people who take themselves 
take advantage of the credits and people who do not. With regard 
to the recipients themselves, the tax-credit framing may be part of 
why even low-income recipients of tax antipoverty programs report 
experiencing less stigma around the tax benefits than around 
welfare benefits.26 With regard to people who themselves do not 
take the credits, some of the relative popularity of the tax credits 
may come from the idea that, even if the person herself is not 
seeing her taxes go down with something like the EITC, someone, 
somewhere, is getting a tax cut. 
A couple of possible complicating facts for hypothesis B: One, 
there is new research including Vanessa Williamson’s recent book 
on the topic, showing that taxes may not be as unpopular as 
conventional wisdom holds.27 According to Williamson’s research, 
Americans in fact like paying taxes and are proud to do so.28 As a 
result, they may not in fact place particular value on tax cuts. 
Another complicating fact for hypothesis 2: Refundable credits are 
also popular relative to direct-spending programs.29 The most 
common explanation I have heard used to be: That is because 
                                                                                                     
 25. See VANESSA S. WILLIAMSON, READ MY LIPS: WHY AMERICANS ARE PROUD 
TO PAY TAXES ix–xi (2017) (describing the “truism” that Americans hate paying 
taxes). 
 26. See Tahk (2014), supra note 3, at 828 (comparing the social stigma 
surrounding recipients of tax benefits versus welfare benefits); see also Laura 
Tach & Sarah Halpern-Meekin, Tax Code Knowledge and Behavioral Responses 
Among EITC Recipients: Policy Insights from Qualitative Data, 33 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 413 (2014) (“[B]uild[ing] on the robust quantitative literature 
on behavioral responses to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).”); Jonathan B. 
Forman, Let’s Keep (and Expand Upon) the Earned Income Credit, 56 TAX NOTES 
233, 233 (1992) (analyzing the EITC). 
 27. See generally Williamson, supra note 25. 
 28. See, e.g., id. at 44, 165 (describing interviews about the things surveyed 
individuals like about paying taxes). 
 29. See Clarke & Fox , supra note 3, at 1276–78 (discussing a survey of 
preferences for receiving direct subsidies relative to tax credits). 
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people do not understand that refundable credits are in fact 
government outlays. However, lack of understanding cannot be the 
full story. In their study, researchers Conor Clarke and Edward 
Fox found that people’s preference for the refundable credits, in 
the study’s words, “did not change when they were given clear 
information about the mechanics of the tax expenditure. Even 
when respondents were given explicit information about what a 
refundable credit is, their preference for the tax programs over the 
direct-spending ones persisted.”30  
If nonetheless, hypothesis B is the right answer, and the tax 
antipoverty programs are relatively popular because they are 
framed as tax cuts, that advantage is likely to be an enduring one. 
Benefits received through the tax code are set up as reducing 
people’s tax liability.31 However, it is possible that despite the 
Clarke and Fox finding, people will catch on to increased use of 
refundability as a policy design feature and come to grapple more 
seriously with the fact that tax anti-poverty programs are not 
always tax cuts. On the other hand, the more that policymakers 
experiment with alternatives like refundability against payroll 
taxes, the more persistent the effect of the tax-cut frame might 
be.32  
The Clarke and Fox finding also poses a challenge to a 
competing hypothesis of mine, hypothesis C, coming from Suzanne 
Mettler’s work on the submerged state. My Hypothesis C is that 
the tax programs are popular relative to welfare because they are 
hiding under the tax code’s giant blanket. In Mettler’s terms, tax 
                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at 1287. 
 31. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 21(a)(1) (2018) (regarding married individuals filing 
joint returns and surviving spouses); (24)(a)(1) (regarding the child tax credit); 32 
(a)(1) (providing examples of provisions providing for credits against tax liability); 
62(a) (allowing taxpayers the benefit of “above-the-line” deductions); 63(b) 
(allowing taxpayers the benefit of the standard deduction); 63(d) (listing the other 
“itemized” deductions that may benefit taxpayers).  
 32. See, e.g., Marco Rubio, Analysis: Tax Relief for Working Families Hinges 
on Child Tax Credit Expansion, MARCO RUBIO, U.S. SENATOR FOR FLORIDA, 
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/10/analysis-tax-relief-for-
working-families-hinges-on-child-tax-credit-expansion (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) 
(discussing the release of an “analysis showing an enhanced child tac credit 
remains the best way to provide meaningful tax relief for working American 
families”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
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benefits are “submerged” in the tax code, which obscures the 
programs’ true natures as government spending programs and 
dooms any future effort at direct expenditures.33 For this reason, 
tax-embedded social policy is a “policy terrain that presents 
immense obstacles to reform itself and to the public’s perception of 
its success.”34 To her, tax antipoverty programs are part of a 
“submerged state . . . [that] eludes most ordinary citizens: they 
have little awareness of its policies or their upwardly 
redistributive effects, and few are cognizant of what is at stake in 
reform efforts.”35 A more upbeat spin on hypothesis C comes from 
the commenter I quoted earlier as saying, tax anti-poverty 
programs are “statism for anti-statists,” allowing the government 
to hide otherwise unpopular welfare using this one neat trick.36  
What would Hypothesis C mean for how likely tax antipoverty 
programs’ relative popularity is to persist? This hypothesis 
suggests that the increased scale and salience of the tax-based 
welfare state is in fact a serious threat. If tax antipoverty programs 
are popular because they are submerged, as they start to surface, 
becoming bigger and more visible, they should become relatively 
less popular. To take a minor but recent example, just two weeks 
ago, Senator Harris proposed a bill called the LIFT the Middle 
Class Act, which included a new refundable tax credit of up to $500 
a month for families earning less than $100,000 a year.37 In 
response, conservative commentator Ben Shapiro tweeted, “[T]his 
isn’t a tax plan at all, but simply cutting checks to people who pay 
                                                                                                     
 33. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT 
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 32 (2011). 
 34. Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of 
Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 803, 803 (2010). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Supra note 7. 
 37. See Kamala D. Harris, Harris Proposes Bold Relief for Families Amid 
Rising Costs of Living, KAMALA D. HARRIS, U.S. SENATOR FOR CALIFORNIA, 
https://www.harris.senate.gov/news/press-releases/harris-proposes-bold-relief-
for-families-amid-rising-costs-of-living (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (“Today, U.S. 
Senator Kamala D. Harris announced the LIFT (Livable Incomes for Families 
Today) the Middle Class Act, legislation to provide middle class and working 
families with a tax credit of up to $6,000 a year—or up to $500 a month—to 
address the rising cost of living.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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little or no income tax in the first place.”38 Seven thousand people 
liked or retweeted the observation.39 If that reaction continued to 
take hold on a larger scale, it could decrease the relative popularity 
of tax-embedded antipoverty programs. 
The first three hypotheses I have discussed have firm roots in 
the literature on the tax-based welfare state. But before leaving 
the question of sustaining relative popularity, I want to consider 
the possible importance of two additional hypotheses that have 
received little to no attention in the literature so far. One pertains 
to race. The evidence on why welfare is relatively unpopular, 
summed up in Martin Gilens’s Why Americans Hate Welfare, 
answers that question exhaustively, and does so with a single 
word: Race.40 Americans have a lot of racist stereotypes of welfare 
recipients.41 What that literature has not yet probed is the fact that 
Americans may have fewer racist stereotypes of recipients of 
tax-embedded benefits. In a recent online commentary for 
Brookings, researchers Cecile Murray and Elizabeth Kneebone 
look not at perceptions but just at the recipient racial breakdown 
itself.42 They argue that,  
                                                                                                     
 38. Ben Shapiro, TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2018, 6:56 AM), 
https://twitter.com/benshapiro/status/1052921391140364288  (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 39. See id. (showing 1,241 retweets and 5,300 likes). 
 40. See, e.g., Hana Brown, The New Racial Politics of Welfare: Ethno-Racial 
Diversity, Immigration, and Welfare Discourse Variation, 87 SOC. SERV. REV. 586, 
596, 606 (2013) (discussing welfare discourse); Gilens, supra note 15, at 167, 204–
06, 213–16 (reviewing survey data about racial stereotypes in thinking about 
welfare); Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New 
Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV., 415, 434–45 (1999) 
(discussing racial politics and welfare reform); Martin Gilens, “Race Coding” and 
White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 593, 593–95 (1996) (discussing 
attitudes towards welfare). 
 41. See Gilens, supra note 15, at 173 (“The cynicism that white Americans 
express toward welfare recipients is fed by their belief that blacks lack a 
commitment to work, in combination with their exaggerated impressions of the 
extent to which African Americans populate the country’s welfare rolls”.). 
 42. See Cecile Murray & Elizabeth Kneebone, The Earned Income Tax Credit 
and the White Working Class, AVENUE (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/04/18/the-earned-income-tax-
credit-and-the-white-working-class/ (discussing the EITC and racial and 
educational lines) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
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The EITC should still have bipartisan appeal today because it 
reaches across the demographic divides that characterized the 
2016 election, particularly those of race and education . . . about 
half of all EITC-eligible taxpayers are white. Furthermore, 
white taxpayers who do not have a college degree—the so-called 
white working class—make up fully 40 percent of all taxpayers 
eligible for the EITC. At the same time, the EITC benefits the 
black and Latino working class, who combined also account for 
40 percent of all taxpayers eligible for the credit.43  
The racial breakdown of TANF recipients is a little different: In 
2016, 37% of recipients were Hispanic, 29% were black and only 
28% were white.44 
While most people who answer public opinion polls 
presumably could not cite those numbers, many of the 
direct- spending antipoverty programs do come with racially 
charged historical baggage that the tax credits may lack.45 I am 
trying to untangle the race thread in a current survey experiment 
of my own, but I have not looked at any of the data yet. Given that 
we do not know the extent to which racial stereotyping currently 
accounts for the public opinion advantage the tax programs have, 
it is even more difficult, though perhaps important, to predict how 
possible disparate racial coding of the two programs might change 
as the tax programs gain importance in the antipoverty landscape. 
The other, and related, hypothesis that the literature has not 
explored is that people prefer the tax antipoverty programs to 
direct-spending antipoverty programs because any given survey 
recipient is much more likely to himself receive a tax-embedded 
benefit than a TANF or SNAP payment. This is because not only 
do most Americans presumably take some tax benefits, many 
middle- and upper-income taxpayers take the very same credits 
that are helping lift others out of poverty.46 The best example of 
                                                                                                     
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Tonya L. Brito, supra note 40 (discussing racial politics and welfare 
reform). 
 46. For instance, before TCJA, the child tax credit was available to couples 
with AGIs up to $150,000/year, or in the top ten percent of the income distribution 
at the time. See Thomas L. Hungerford & Rebecca Thiess, The Earned Income 
Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit: History, Purpose, Goals, and Effectiveness, 
ECON. POL’Y INST (Sep. 23, 2013), https://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-
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that is of course the child credit, which is not as powerful an 
antipoverty tool as the EITC but does have its own substantial role 
in lifting families out of poverty.47 After the 2017 tax legislation, 
many more families will be taking advantage of that credit.48 If tax 
antipoverty programs are popular because they are widely 
available, more growth to these programs may in fact enhance, 
rather than diminish, their relative popularity.  
III. Legal Frameworks 
Moving on from relative popularity, the second major, and 
possibly persistent, difference between the tax antipoverty 
programs and their non-tax counterparts: Their different legal 
frameworks. By this I mean the legal consequences of the fact that 
tax antipoverty programs are tax law, living in the tax code, and 
the direct-spending antipoverty programs are not. This is 
something I have written about, but I am especially curious what 
others in the room, particularly experts on tax practice and 
                                                                                                     
income-tax-credit-and-the-child-tax-credit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/ 
(providing a comprehensive overview of the EITC) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). To take another example, the 
child care credit does not have an AGI or other income ceiling, so even the highest-
income taxpayers may be eligible for it. 
 47. The child credit lifted approximately 2.7 million people out of poverty in 
2016, including about 1.5 million children and lessened poverty for another 12.3 
million people, including 6.1 million children. See Policy Basics: The Child Tax 
Credit, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/ 
federal-tax/policy-basics-the-child-tax-credit?fa=view&id=2989 (last visited Feb. 
19, 2019) (highlighting the positive effects of the CTC) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). In contrast, the EITC 
lifted about 5.8 million people out of poverty, including about 3 million children 
and reduced the severity of poverty for another 18.7 million people, including 6.9 
million children. See Policy Basics: The Child Tax Credit, CTR. FOR BUDGET& 
POLICY PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-the-
earned-income-tax-credit (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (highlighting the positive 
effects of the EITC) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 48. Starting in 2018, under TCJA, married taxpayers with a modified AGI 
of up to $450,000 will be potentially eligible for the child credit. See Phase Out, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/phaseout.asp (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2019) (discussing the phase out for married taxpayers filing jointly) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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procedure, have to say about it. As tax lawyers know well, sections 
of the tax code are heavily interlinked.49 Sections of the tax code 
reference each other, and some govern many others.50 For instance, 
the Code sections on penalties and procedures apply, unless 
otherwise specified, to whatever programs live in the Code.51 As a 
result, a different set of attendant rules and rights attach to the 
tax antipoverty programs than to the non-tax ones.52  
To take a couple of examples: One example is the Taxpayer 
Bill of Rights, or, really, bills of rights, both the list of ten rights 
codified in 2015 and the various pieces of legislation passed in the 
1990s.53 These apply, with varying degrees of relevance, to the tax 
anti-poverty programs and do not apply at all to their non-tax 
counterparts. No corresponding body of federal rights law governs 
non-tax programs, most of which depend heavily on state law 
anyway. Perhaps for the public-opinion reasons I discussed above, 
the history of the non-tax anti-poverty programs has seen a lot of 
efforts to take away rights, rather than to build up more of them.54 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Tahk (2013), supra note 3, at 88–89; see also STANLEY S. SURREY & 
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 62 (1985).  
 50. See Tahk (2013), supra note 3, at 89 (discussing the tax code provisions 
that cross-reference each other often). 
 51. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6001 (2018) (requiring “every person liable for tax under 
this title, or for the collection thereof” to keep relevant record); id. at 6011 
(requiring “[e]very person required to make a return or statement” to provide 
required information on that return); id. at 7203 (imposing penalties on “[a]ny 
person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by 
this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep 
any records, or supply any information.”).  
 52. The above-cited rules only apply to programs governed by the law under 
Title 26 of the U.S. Code, where the rules for programs based in the tax code are 
found, not to any other programs.  
 53. See, e.g., Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-647, § 6226, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730 (containing the “Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights,” known as “TBOR 1”); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1, 
110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (being described as “TBOR 2”); Internal Revenue Service 
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3000, 112 Stat. 685, 
726 (containing the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, known as “TBOR 3”); Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 401, 129 Stat. 2242, 3117 (2015) 
(discussing the “duty to ensure that Internal Revenue Service employees are 
familiar with and act in accord with certain taxpayer rights”).  
 54. See, e.g., Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of 
Devolution, 9 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 125–32 (2002) (discussing the 
devolution of TANF and the attempts to strip it of effect); Michele Estrin Gilman, 
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Another example, various pieces of recipient-adverse case law 
that developed in the context of eroding welfare programs do not 
apply to the tax antipoverty programs. For instance, take the law 
on “entitlements.” The 1996 welfare legislation specified that while 
AFDC had been a federal “entitlement,” TANF would not be.55 
Courts have picked up on that language to hold that after welfare 
reform, welfare payments are entitled to less robust procedural 
due process protections.56 It is true—and I think, possibly legally 
important—that the constitutional due process protections 
afforded to tax refunds are still unclear, but there is no reason to 
think that the particularly unfavorable statutory and case law on 
entitlements should apply to them.57  
Along similar lines, part of the 1996 welfare statute banned 
federally funded legal-services organizations from “participat[ing] 
in litigation, lobbying or rulemaking involving an effort to reform 
a Federal or State welfare system.”58 Sociologists of public interest 
                                                                                                     
Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 603–
23 (2001) (discussing the degradation of TANF through its privatization); Cynthia 
R. Farina, On Misusing “Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due Process and 
the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 618–23 (1998) (explaining the 
limitations of AFDC and TANF); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1309, 1337–38 (2012) (highlighting the due process concerns of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996); 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process 
Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997) (explaining how AFDC was 
removed and absorbed by TANF). 
 55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(b) (West 1997) (“This [legislation] shall not be 
interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance.”). 
 56. See, e.g., Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 475–77 (Colo. App. 2001) (“The 
federal government may decide not to make funding available to the states for 
welfare programs, and may withhold funding from states that fail to follow federal 
standards. In either of these situations, individuals expecting welfare benefits 
cannot sue the states for benefits not given.”); State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Res., 575 S.E.2d 393, 402 (W. Va. 2004) (“Therefore, in light 
of the specific dictates of the Congress and the [West Virginia] Legislature, we 
must reject petitioners' argument that a pre-termination hearing is required 
before ending TANF cash assistance due to the expiration of the five-year time 
limit.”). 
 57. See Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 
875, 904–05 (2018) (“[T[he refund is, for the purposes of property law [and 
procedural due process], more like the salary the taxpayer earned in the first 
place than like a benefit that the government later decided to bestow.”). 
 58. 49 C.F.R. pt. 1639 (1996). For a study of these regulations and their 
effects, see Marina Zaloznaya & Laura Beth Nielsen, Mechanisms and 
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law have found that, in the words of one of their papers, that 
statutory language “drastically reduced the amount of welfare 
rights litigation in the United States, causing legal-aid caseloads 
to fall by millions of cases and putting hundreds of legal-aid 
lawyers out of work.”59 There is no reason I can see, however, that 
this rule should apply to many of you in the room, tax lawyers who 
represent beneficiaries of tax-embedded social programs. Further, 
related to the point I made earlier about how some of the tax 
antipoverty programs are approaching near-universal availability, 
crafting a provision banning tax lawyers from similar activities 
would present some challenges. How would Congress write a law 
that says tax lawyers cannot participate in rulemaking for the 
child care credit, but they can for the home-mortgage interest 
deduction? They cannot for the low-income housing credit, but they 
can for the energy tax credits? Those distinctions would rest on 
somewhat theoretically shaky grounds and might get pushback 
from clients who like having their lawyers represent them in 
rulemaking, or from the tax bar itself.60 
The legal consequences of being in the tax code may be some 
of the most entrenched hallmarks of tax antipoverty policy, and 
the ones most likely to endure. As a matter of statute and case law, 
of law on the books, while legislators are able to, and have, passed 
specific rules that govern particular tax anti-poverty programs, the 
default is that the general tax legal framework will apply to 
anything in the tax code, and the general welfare—or SNAP, or 
Medicaid, or other legal framework—will not.61 Further, as a 
matter of law in action, of practical legal dynamics, the tax legal 
framework, unlike the welfare legal framework (or the SNAP 
framework, or the Medicaid legal framework), continues to develop 
                                                                                                     
Consequences of Professional Marginality: The Case of Poverty Lawyers Revisited, 
36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 925 (2011) (discussing the history of the Legal Services 
Corporation); Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of 
Public Interest Law Practice: 1975 – 2004, 84 N.C.L. REV. 1591, 1616–17 (2006) 
(same).  
 59. Zaloznaya & Nielsen, supra note 58, at 925.  
 60. In addition, as mentioned above, the procedural provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code generally apply to all programs housed within. See I.R.C. 
Regulations, supra note 51. 
 61. See id. 
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under circumstances where it affects everyone who interacts with 
the tax code, business and nonbusiness, rich and poor.62 That 
means that in many situations, the same rules apply to recipients 
of tax antipoverty programs as to taxpayers with more resources.63 
Taxpayers with more resources then are able to use those 
resources to influence how recipient-friendly the tax law becomes. 
The example I always used to use was the question of whether the 
refundable portion of a refundable credit is itself income. That is 
an unresolved issue where well-represented business taxpayers 
were presumably hoping to get a taxpayer-favorable answer and 
whatever success they had would also apply to poor recipients of 
refundable credits.64 Another more recent example is the issue in 
the Facebook case about whether the 10-item Taxpayer Bill of 
Rights as codified gives rise to substantive legal rights.65 While the 
magistrate in that case ruled against Facebook on that issue,66 the 
case was still an instance in which a team of paid lawyers from 
Baker & McKenzie, working on behalf of Facebook, were arguing 
that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights affords taxpayers substantive 
protection, as was the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, represented by 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.67 That argument also has 
                                                                                                     
 62. See Tahk, supra note 57, at 900–01 (discussing the ramifications of 
Facebook v. I.R.S.). 
 63. See id. (same). 
 64. For a discussion of this issue, see Tahk (2013), supra note 3 at 95–98. 
 65. See generally Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive or Mandamus-Like 
Relief, Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-
06490-LB (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017). 
 66. See generally Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, 
Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-06490-
LB (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018). 
 67. See Facebook’s Opposition to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Facebook, Inc. & 
Subsidiaries v. Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-06490-LB at 10 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 09, 2018) (“A determination that Congress’s codification of TBOR 
created substantive taxpayer rights is thus fully consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s refusal to read statutes in a manner that renders the language as mere 
surplusage [sic].” (citations omitted)); Br. of the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States of America as Amicus Curiae, Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. 
Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-06490-LB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2018) 
(“The Taxpayer Bill of Rights guarantees taxpayers the right to appeal a decision 
of the Internal Revenue Service . . . .”). 
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the potential to help poor taxpayers who receive the EITC or the 
premium tax credit or any of the other tax antipoverty programs.  
We do see political efforts to carve out the tax antipoverty 
provisions and differentiate them from the others, giving them, in 
essence, their own law. Most notably the PATH Act of 2015 applied 
specifically to some of the tax antipoverty programs, preventing 
retroactive claims of the EITC after the issuance of Social Security 
numbers and requiring the IRS to hold income tax refunds until 
February 15 if the tax return included a claim for the EITC or the 
additional child tax credit.68 Will we see more of that? Perhaps as 
the tax antipoverty programs become more visible, we will. But the 
fact remains that most tax law, specifically most tax procedure, is 
not EITC-specific; it’s for every tax benefit. That is a feature of tax 
antipoverty programs that may erode over time, but only slowly, 
and only with focused legislative intent. In contrast, welfare law is 
inherently welfare-specific, SNAP law is inherently SNAP-specific, 
and so forth. For this reason, while poverty tax law could, over a 
long period of time, become its own area of law, with its own 
statutes and case law, it will remain persistently distinct from the 
laws that govern the direct-spending programs. 
IV. Administration 
Third, major, and possibly persistent disparity between the 
tax anti-poverty programs and their non-tax counterparts: 
Administrative differences. This is an area where I see some real 
potential for the paths of the tax and non-tax antipoverty programs 
to converge. For reasons I will explain, I do not predict that the 
paths will come together completely, but I do see more of a 
possibility. Why? While the tax antipoverty programs have 
traditionally presented opportunities for administrative 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-113, §§ 201(b), 204 (2015) (“No credit or refund of an overpayment for a 
taxable year shall be made to a taxpayer before the 15th day of the second month 
following the close of such taxable year if a credit is allowed to such taxpayer 
under section 24 (by reason of subsection (d) thereof) or 32 for such taxable year.”). 
For an excellent discussion on the phenomenon of a separate low-income-specific 
body of tax law, see generally Leslie Book, U.S. Refundable Credits: The Taxing 
Realities of Being Poor, 4 J. TAX ADMIN. 71 (2018).  
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efficiencies, enormous federal antipoverty programs can only be so 
easy, and so cheap, to administer. Although once upon a time, the 
EITC was merely one more line on a tax return, it’s not clear how 
feasible it ever was for that to remain the case. In their 2004 
article, David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, in an oft-cited (by me) 
line, found that “estimates have put the administrative costs of the 
EITC at . . . less than one-tenth the amount spent on the [food 
stamp program]. Even at this lower cost, the EITC is substantially 
larger than the FSP.”69 They continue, “[n]otwithstanding the 
vastly higher administrative and compliance costs of the FSP, it is 
not clear that it is any more accurate.”70 With figures like that, the 
tax programs looked like a wonderful administrative deal.  
However, that deal was perhaps not sustainable, at least for 
the tax anti-poverty programs that require individual and family 
recipients affirmatively to claim the benefits for which they may 
be eligible. As the Taxpayer Advocate wrote in her, the EITC was 
“designed to have an easy ‘application’ process by allowing an 
individual to claim the benefit on his or her tax return. This 
approach dramatically lowered administrative costs, because it did 
not require an infrastructure of case workers and local agencies.”71 
However, she added, “the easy application process of the EITC is 
also associated with a high improper payment rate.”72 In testimony 
from 2015, she constructs a measure of program efficiency where 
she takes the overhead costs of a variety of direct-spending 
antipoverty programs, adds that to the improper payments for 
each of those programs, and then takes that figure, overhead plus 
improper payments, as a percent of the total benefits the program 
pays out.73 That measure, she implies, should tell us something 
                                                                                                     
 69. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 3, at 1004.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Nat’l Taxpayer Advoc., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2018 61, 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-
JRC/JRC18_Volume1_AOF_06.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Written Statement of Nina E. Olson, U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOV’T 
OPERATIONS 26 (Apr. 15, 2015) (final row of table listing “overhead costs + 
improper payments as a % of total”). 
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about the administrative ease of the different programs.74 
According to her figures, which do raise some methodological 
questions, the EITC, the only tax-based program in the data, is in 
the middle of the pack.75 For the EITC, overhead costs plus 
improper payments equal 25% of the total benefits paid out.76 For 
TANF, that figure is a remarkably similar 24.7%.77 CHIP, the 
federal children’s health insurance program, is the worst 
performer with a 44% costs plus improper payments figure, and 
SNAP, in contrast to the Weisbach and Nussim finding, actually 
does the best, with overhead plus improper payments equal to 
about 9% of the overall program costs.78 
In addition to the improper payments issue, there are take-up 
concerns. In the words of economists Saurabh Bhargava and 
Dayanand Manoli, who have recently been doing some very 
interesting experimental work on the problem, the EITC has “an 
estimated incomplete take-up rate of [twenty-five] percent, 
amounting to 6.7 million non-claimants each year.”79 They 
continue, “[t]he consequences of incomplete take-up can be 
significant. The typical EITC non-claimant forgoes an estimated 
$1,096, equivalent to [thirty-three] days of income.”80 And, the 
authors add, what is more, “[t]hese non-claimants sacrifice other 
advantages, such as those related to health, education, or 
consumption, that may be linked to transfers” from the tax 
credits.81 
                                                                                                     
 74. See id. at 27 (“This table demonstrates that for a program of such 
significant size, administered at a federal level, the EITC reaches an 
extraordinary number and percentage of eligible taxpayers at a modest cost, when 
overhead and overclaims are considered together.”) 
 75. See id. (showing that the 25% figure for the EITC is somewhere in the 
middle of the programs listed in the table). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. For the Weisbach & Nussim point, see Weisbach & Nussim, supra 
note 3, at 1004.  
 79. Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the 
Incomplete Take-up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 
105 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2015). 
 80. Id. at 1–2. 
 81. Id. at 2. 
CONVERGING WELFARE STATES 485 
 
In sum, administrative problems with the tax antipoverty 
programs have emerged—both regarding take-up and regarding 
compliance. It is not an accident that the Taxpayer Advocate 
includes EITC issues as one of the most serious problems facing 
the IRS in so many of her recent reports.82 For instance, in 2013, 
one of the “most serious problems” described in the report was the 
fact that, as a response to the perceived overpayments issue, “[t]he 
                                                                                                     
 82. See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 91 (2018), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-
ARC/ARC18_Volume1.pdf (highlighting the troubles of administering the EITC) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 141 (2017), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-
ARC/ARC17_Volume1.pdf (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Annual REP. TO CONGRESS 2015 235, 240, 248, 261 (2015), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Vo
lume1.pdf (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 2013 103 (2013), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf 
(same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice);  
(NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 2011 296 (2011), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2011-annual-
report/IRS%20TAS%20ARC%202011%20VOL%201.pdf (same) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2007 REP. TO CONGRESS 222 (2007), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/arc_2007_vol_1_cover_msps.pdf (same) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2005 REP. TO CONGRESS 94 (2005), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/section_1.pdf (same) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 26 (2003), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_1-15-042.pdf 
(same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., FY2002 ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 36 (2002), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/arc2002_section_one.pdf (same) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., FY2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 26, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2001_tas.pdf (2001) (same) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);  
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC.’S FY2000 ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 26 (2000), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub2104-2000.pdf (same) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
486 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 465 (2019) 
 
IRS [is now] inappropriately ban[ing] many taxpayers from 
claiming the EITC.”83 There are several ways in which that may be 
true, and in the 2013 report, the Taxpayer Advocate takes as her 
main example the Section 32(k) language authorizing the IRS to 
ban taxpayers from claiming the EITC for two years if the IRS 
determines they claimed the credit improperly, to quote the 
statute, “due to reckless or intentional disregard of rules and 
regulations.”84 She found that in 2011, “[t]he IRS imposed the ban 
improperly almost forty percent of the time . . . [i]n only ten 
percent of the cases did a taxpayer’s response to the audit raise the 
possibility that he or she had the requisite state of mind to justify 
the two-year ban, [i]n [sixty-nine] percent of the cases, the ban was 
imposed without required managerial approval and [i]n almost 
ninety percent of the cases, neither IRS work papers nor 
communications to the taxpayer contained the required 
explanation of why the ban was imposed.”85  
Another example: In 2015, the Taxpayer Advocate found that 
the correspondence audits that the IRS initiates with regard to the 
EITC are not working well.86 The IRS expends a lot of resources 
auditing the EITC.87 In 2015, EITC audits made up thirty-five 
percent of all IRS audits, even though EITC claims were only on 
nineteen percent of returns filed.88 The Taxpayer Advocate found 
                                                                                                     
 83. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 103 (2013) 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see 
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. (2013), supra note 82, at 103 (“The IRS Inappropriately 
Bans Many Taxpayers from Claiming EITC.”). 
 84. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 103 (2013) 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 85. Id. at 103–04. 
 86. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 248–60 (2015) 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC 
/ARC15_Volume1.pdf (“The IRS is not adequately using the EITC examination 
process as an educational tool and is not auditing returns with the greatest 
indirect potential for improving EITC compliance.”) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 87. See generally id.  
 88. See id. at 249 (“In fact, EITC audits make up [thirty-five] percent of all 
IRS audits despite the fact that EITC returns account for only nineteen percent 
of all returns filed.”). 
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that these audits have a no-response rate of forty percent.89 That 
means that in many of these cases, the audited individual very well 
might have a defense and simply does not attempt to offer it, 
probably due to a lack of understanding about what a defense 
might be and about how to assert it. Without ever finding out if 
that is true, the IRS goes ahead and assesses the tax and any 
penalties, possibly violating a number of now statutorily enshrined 
taxpayer rights.90 The correspondence audit process may not cost 
as much as actual administrative hearings, but it is not clear that 
it is arriving at the right answers. 
All of this is to say that the initial picture of the tax system as 
a miraculously cheap and accurate way to deliver benefits has 
become more complicated as the tax antipoverty programs have 
become bigger and more widely available. This is not a surprise. 
The tension between accuracy and cost is inherent to disbursing 
government benefits, even on a small scale. As the programs 
themselves scale up, so too does the tension. 
On the other hand, both the government and academic 
researchers are working to find ways to improve administration of 
tax benefits, the EITC in particular. This new research offers 
low- cost opportunities to improve administrative problems like 
take-up and noncompliance. 
 What is notable about many of these suggestions for 
improvement is that they rely on efficiencies built into the tax 
system. For instance, in the Bhargava and Manoli paper, the two 
economists find, using a field experiment, that merely sending 
reminder notices to potential EITC claimants significantly 
increases take-up.91 In particular, eligible individuals were 
substantially more likely to claim the EITC when they received a 
reminder notice that was, in contrast to the standard IRS notice, 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. (“The EITC audit program has a no-response rate of over [forty] 
percent . . . .”). 
 90. See id. at 252 (“Moreover, a collection strategy based on ignorance and 
guesswork increases the risk of taking collection actions that are more intrusive 
than necessary, thereby undermining taxpayer trust in the system and 
undermining taxpayers’ right to privacy.”). 
 91. See Bhargava & Manoli, supra note 79, at 32 (“For example, we estimate 
that the mere distribution of a second mailing, approximately similar to the first 
reminder notice, would result in an addition 45,000 claimants . . . .”).  
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“single-sided, featured a larger and more readable font and a 
prominent headline” and came with a claim worksheet that was 
non-repetitive and with a cleaner layout and a different font.92 
Take-up rates also substantially went up when eligible individuals 
received information on a mailer about how big their EITC benefit 
could in fact be.93 The EITC never had a big a take-up problem as 
the non-tax antipoverty programs (the EITC participation rate 
among eligible claimants is about seventy-five percent, as opposed 
to forty-two percent for TANF, fifty-five percent for SNAP and 
forty-six percent for the oft-scapegoated SSI).94 But this new 
research is showing that the IRS can make major strides to address 
even its smaller EITC take-up problem merely by changing the 
font and layout of its mailers.95 The relatively efficient process 
where recipients claim their benefits simply by mailing a form, as 
it turns out, is also relatively easy to improve. 
Similarly, the Taxpayer Advocate has used experiments to 
show the possible large effects of relatively low-cost administrative 
fixes on the compliance front.96 For example, she found in her 
research, that EITC compliance went up substantially when her 
office sent a letter to previously noncompliant EITC claimants that 
“explained the requirements for claiming EITC in plain language, 
identified the specific requirement the recipient [had not] 
appear[ed] to meet [in the past], and suggested sources of 
additional information and assistance, including the Taxpayer 
Advocate Service itself.”97 Then, she also found that when her office 
offered, in the same letter, the number for a dedicated “Extra Help” 
telephone line “staffed by TAS employees trained to answer 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at 12. 
 93. See id. at 21 (“Among treatments that provided information, the display 
of benefit information was the most potent.”).  
 94. See id. at 8 (“A recent analysis by the IRS based on data for TY 2005, 
which informs assumptions used in this study, suggests an overall program 
uptake rate of [seventy-five] percent . . . .”). 
 95. See id. at 17 (“The comparison suggest a large net positive effect of 
simplification on response . . . as well as of information . . . .”). 
 96. See generally id. 
 97. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 15 (2017), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/ResearchStudies/AR
C17_Volume2_02_StudySubsequent.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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taxpayer questions about the letter and the EITC eligibility 
rules,”98 compliance increased even further.99 Staffing a help line 
and sending an additional letter are not free, but again, they are 
relatively low-cost interventions that, according to Taxpayer 
Advocate data, have the possibility, taken together, to reduce 
erroneous EITC claims by about $75 million a year.100 Both of them 
take advantage of the relatively streamlined system by which 
people make EITC overclaims in the first place to introduce 
features that can substantially reduce those claims.101 Given that 
the application for most of the direct-spending programs was 
always more complex, it is hard to imagine equally cost-effective 
interventions that could as substantially reduce corresponding 
problems in those programs.  
Taking all of this together, possible changes to public opinion, 
to the law itself, and to tax administration, the answer to whether 
the trajectories of tax anti-poverty programs and their non-tax 
counterparts will converge turns out, unsurprisingly, to be 
complicated. I hope that future research on some of these questions 
can help us to understand, and in fact to shape, these trajectories, 
and I am looking forward to seeing many of the people in this room 
conduct that research in the years to come. 
V. Normative Concerns 
Before concluding, I want to put aside for a minute the positive 
question of whether the future of the tax anti-poverty programs 
                                                                                                     
 98. NTA Blog: TAS Research Shows that Education Improves EITC 
Compliance, TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV. (Sept. 20, 2018), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-tas-research-shows-that-
education-improves-eitc-compliance (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 99. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 91, 102 (2018), 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018-
ARC/ARC18_Volume2.pdf (giving the results of this experiment) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 100. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., supra note 97, at 14, 15. 
 101. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT 91, 93 n.17 (2018) (defining 
“overclaims” as “the difference between the amount of EITC claimed by the 
taxpayer on his or her return and the amount the taxpayer should have claimed”) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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will converge with the story of the direct spending programs. I am 
going to turn to the normative question: Insofar as they do 
converge, is that necessarily bad?  
The easy answer to this question, and the one implicit in most 
of this talk so far, is yes. After all, from a political perspective, the 
big federal welfare program, AFDC, was unpopular and for this 
reason, eventually repealed.102 Its successor is smaller and for that 
reason, less adept at reducing the poverty rate.103 Scholars have 
also exhaustively documented how, even when AFDC existed, it 
was the lower tier in a racialized two-tiered welfare state.104 
Recipients found it user-unfriendly and also stigmatizing.105 From 
a legal perspective, poverty lawyers seem to agree that the body of 
law that developed around AFDC and TANF, and also around 
some of the other direct-spending anti-poverty programs, was full 
of recipient-adverse decisions and statutes that placed major 
hurdles in advocates’ paths.106 From an administrative 
                                                                                                     
 102. See supra Part I. 
 103. See Scholz et al., supra note 1, at 220–21 (showing in a graph the effect 
of transfers on poverty). 
 104. See, e.g., Karen M. Suzanne Mettler, The Stratification of Social 
Citizenship: Gender and Federalism in the Formation of Old Age Insurance and 
Aid to Dependent Children, 11 J. OF POL’Y HIST. 31, 31 (1999) (arguing that social 
citizenship became organized as a two-tiered system in terms of gender due to 
“political battles over the proper institutional arrangements for program 
administration”); Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Social Citizenship by Gender: The 
Implementation of Unemployment Insurance and Aid to Dependent Children, 
1935–1950, 12 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 303, 303 (1998) (noting that the American 
welfare state emerged as “two-tiered” or “two-track” in character, which divided 
American social citizenship by gender); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before 
the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 318 n.12 
(2012) (noting that in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), the Supreme 
Court “found no equal protection violation in a state law that set lower level 
benefits for AFDC recipients than for recipients of other need-based assistance 
programs”). See generally Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizenship, in DIVIDING 
CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998); NANCY 
FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY 
SOCIAL THEORY (1989).  
 105. See Jennifer Sykes et al., Dignity and Dreams: What the Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) Means to Low-Income Families, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 243, 258–59 
(2015) (explaining a single mother’s concern that welfare recipients “‘just sit on 
welfare’” (citations omitted)). 
 106. See, e.g., Tani, supra note 104, at 381, 125–57; Cimini, supra note 54, at 
125–32 (explaining how devolving policymaking to county and local officials risks 
the enforcement of procedural due process rights for TANF recipients); Tani, 
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perspective, it imposed substantial administrative burden.107 As 
students of and participants in the tax system, we probably do not 
want any of that.  
However, a few complications to the normative question. First, 
the voices most critical of the tax antipoverty programs focus on 
overpayments.108 In calling for more guardrails against them, they 
are in fact envisioning a system that’s more like welfare, in which 
there are different and stricter rules for poorer recipients. The IRS 
is moving in that direction with its high EITC audit rate and 
increasingly multilayered processing of EITC claims.109 AFDC and 
TANF have never been perfect at reducing overpayments, and 
certainly complaints about welfare fraud were and remain 
common.110 However, direct-spending programs—perhaps because 
they are unpopular—have traditionally been more comfortable 
erecting barriers to participation so as to risk fewer 
overpayments.111 I prefer the tradeoff that the tax programs make: 
                                                                                                     
supra note 104, at 381 (“Critics have long alleged that when benefits come with 
rights, or are packaged as rights, policymakers lose flexibility, taxpayers suffer, 
and the poor lose incentive to work.”). 
 107. See Donald Moynihan et al., Administrative Burden: Learning, 
Psychological, and Compliance Costs in Citizen-State Interactions, 25 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 43, 44 (2015) (explaining how administrative burden in 
AFDC and TANF have reduced participation). 
 108. See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, The $16 Billion Tax-Credit Black Hole, NAT’L 
REV. (June 1, 2016), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/06/eitc-fraud-
honduran-scammers-steal-millions/ (arguing that the EITC “has ballooned into a 
massive welfare entitlement” to those who do not pay taxes) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Chris Edwards & 
Veronique de Rugy, Earned Income Tax Credit: Small Benefits, Large Costs, CATO 
INST. TAX & BUDGET BULLETIN 73 (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/earned-income-tax-credit-
small-benefits-large-costs (arguing that the EITC “has a high error and fraud 
rate” and “creates a disincentive to increase earnings”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 109. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., supra note 71, at 100 (suggesting that an 
affidavit be incorporated into the EITC audit process for a taxpayer to use for 
substantiating his or her claim to help reduce improper payment rate); Leslie 
Book, U.S. Refundable Credits: The Taxing Realities of Being Poor, 4 J. OF TAX 
ADMIN. 71, 80 (2018) (noting that program complexity is a “main driver of error”). 
 110. For a discussion of public perceptions of welfare fraud, see Gilens, supra 
note 15, at 63–64. 
 111. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin & Malay Majmundar, Administrative Exclusion: 
Organizations and the Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming, 20 J. of PUB. ADMIN. 
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Easier access at the risk of more overpayments, but some might 
reasonably prefer a different one. 
Then, I am so happy this conference includes a panel on 
universal basic income alternatives, because I want to talk for a 
minute about universality. Many of the most persistent 
advantages that the tax anti-poverty programs may have persisted 
because the tax system is so universal.112 Why might the tax 
programs’ relative popularity endure? At least in part because so 
many people get tax benefits. Even rich, white people get tax 
benefits. Why do the law governing tax programs remain so 
different from the law governing non-tax programs? Because that 
law applies to all taxpayers, not just EITC recipients.113 Why is the 
tax administrative apparatus relatively easy to fix? Because the 
same low-cost, non-stigmatizing application process, return filing 
applies to everybody.114  
I have argued in my written work, and will happily continue 
to argue, that the universality of the tax antipoverty programs is 
not just the source of their most enduring features, but one of their 
best.115 Universality explains much of their success. Also, the 
vision of equal treatment of everyone in the U.S. standing before 
the same tax law, is one that holds enormous normative appeal for 
me. Participating in the tax system implies membership in the 
group collecting the taxes, in another word, citizenship.116 As Larry 
Zelenak has written, the act of filing a tax return is a form of active 
civic participation that implies a willingness to assume the 
responsibilities as well as the benefits of membership in a political 
community.117 Using tax returns as the means by which 
                                                                                                     
RES. AND THEORY 827, 842 (2010) (discussing administrative barriers in the TANF 
context); Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 3, at 1001 (discussing administrative 
barriers in the food stamps context). 
 112. See supra Part I.  
 113. See supra Part II. 
 114. See supra Part III. 
 115. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 98–101 (arguing that the universality of the 
tax system fosters the inclusion of often times marginalized groups). 
 116. See id. at 99 (“Assuming the mantle of a taxpayer arguably confers on 
the recipient the sense that he or she is a stakeholder in the government that 
collects the taxes.”). 
 117. See Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic 
Virtues of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 61 (2007) 
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low-income people claim benefits allows them too to participate in 
this civic ritual and symbolically claim the associated 
responsibilities and rights of citizenship, placing them on equal 
footing with all the other participants.118 
Conversely, citizenship is a troublingly exclusive concept, 
historically tied to membership in a dominant elite, defined by 
class, gender, and race.119 While using the tax code for antipoverty 
policy expands the definition of who gets to belong to the political 
community of citizens, tax-based social policy still implicates that 
fundamentally exclusive concept and implies that people who, 
often by reason of income or race or other disadvantage, do not 
qualify to participate, also do not deserve benefits. As a result, we 
are missing a program that’s actually targeted at including the 
excluded. That leaves a hole in the social-policy landscape.  
Welfare and other direct-spending antipoverty programs, are 
tailored, for better or worse, toward the genuinely disadvantaged 
in this country.120 Benefits were available not as part of a quid pro 
quo for active citizenship, but because the U.S. decided that it 
should give particular help to people of particular need.121 The way 
to qualify for direct-spending anti-poverty programs was to 
demonstrate need. The fact that welfare is not universal and is 
instead targeted at people outside of the U.S. dominant race and 
class is arguably why welfare became unpopular, and why legal 
and political elites were so determined to erect legal and 
administrative barriers to entry. The U.S. replaced it with tax 
                                                                                                     
(referring to tax return filing “as a valuable civic ceremony should be attractive 
to those who subscribe to a fairly wide range of republican or liberal political 
theories.”).  
 118. See id. (“The filing requirement also promotes the goal of political 
equality . . . by recognizing and formalizing the status of each tax return filer as 
a taxpayer—whether her tax liability happens to be $1 or $1 million.”). 
 119. Discussion of this point has been going on for millennia, but for two 
recent examples in the U.S. context, see Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America, 
Equal Citizenship and the Constitution, 43–49 (1989); Eileen Boris, The 
Racialized Gendered State: Constructions of Citizenship in the United States, 5 
SOC. POL. 160, 165 (1998). 
 120. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601 2018 (“The purpose of this part is to increase 
the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to . . . provide assistance 
to needy families . . . .”). 
 121. See id. (same). 
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anti-poverty programs that are more popular, and legally and 
administratively more user-friendly perhaps because they are not 
tailored toward the most disadvantaged. 
That raises several practical problems for the tax antipoverty 
programs. For one, the US has plenty of people living in extreme 
poverty who need help and are not getting it from these 
programs.122 For another, the tax-based social welfare programs 
distribute massive benefits to people who are not in fact in need.123 
Through these programs, the government is expending substantial 
resources on benefits for middle- and upper-income individuals124. 
If the cost of an antipoverty program really now has to include 
major outlays on the nonpoor, that makes these programs much 
more expensive to run. On a moral rather than a practical level, I 
also find it disquieting to note that the U.S. is particularly willing 
and able to support a social-policy apparatus when it is not 
explicitly targeted toward the people most in need, many of whom 
are quite different in identity from the white middle-income voters 
who answer public opinion polls and the politicians who represent 
them. Directing low-income people through the tax return process 
to claim benefits may reassure members of dominant groups: 
Low-income people, they are just like us! But our goal as a society, 
I think, should be to offer relief even to people who are not like us. 
The race angle perhaps puts the problem into starkest relief. 
The rise of the tax antipoverty programs and the fall of 
direct-spending programs means the fall of programs that racial 
groups take advantage of in equal measure and the rise of 
programs that are majority white.125 But I can put the same 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 839 (discussing work requirements that 
accompany certain antipoverty provisions, which prevent many families in 
extreme poverty from benefiting from these tax programs). 
 123. See What is the Child Tax Credit?, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-child-tax-credit (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2019) (stating that the families receiving the Child Tax Credit are highest 
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in the highest income quintile receiving the CTC is 87%) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).  
 124. See id. (stating that families in the lowest income quintile are less likely 
to benefit for the child tax credit than middle- and high-income families). 
 125. See Murray & Kneebone, supra note 42 (showing that about half of EITC 
eligible taxpayers are white).  
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problem in economic terms: We took away a program that was for 
low-income people and replaced it with programs that are 
available across the income ladder. As a practical result, some of 
the most disadvantaged members of U.S. society materially lose 
out, because they do not qualify for the tax antipoverty 
programs.126 Even if we could – and as I have argued elsewhere, 
should—refine the tax antipoverty programs so that they reach 
even Americans with very low incomes, to the extent the 
increasingly tax-based U.S. social policy landscape continues to 
diverge from traditional welfare programs, the discourse around it 
reduces the salience of many of the U.S.’s most marginalized 
people and elides the question of what we as a society might owe 
them.127 
Then, to take a different normative question, how do these 
predictions about the future of tax anti-poverty policy affect what 
we do, as scholars and also as advocates, for clients sometimes, and 
also for a better system? I am not the most experienced scholar or 
advocate in the room, so I have more to learn from you than you 
from me. All I want to say is that the long-range perspective 
remains important. While, the direct-spending programs often 
serve as a negative foil in my work, one of the best moments I have 
had as a researcher was a fall morning two Octobers ago this year, 
reading about the history of the welfare-rights movement, and how 
the grassroots activists and lawyers behind that movement 
attempted to use their cases, and their systemic advocacy to 
enshrine in case law their robust view of social citizenship.128 They 
started with the problems of the poorest welfare recipients and 
from there, developed a fully imagined picture of a legal system 
dedicated to protecting social and economic rights.129 A lot of what 
the welfare rights movement did was not successful, and we might 
                                                                                                     
 126. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 839 (stating that many of the most extreme 
impoverished families are prevented from taking advantage of tax antipoverty 
programs due the fact that taxpayers who do not work often do not file tax 
returns).  
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 128. See generally MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE 
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not agree with everything it tried to accomplish. But today, still 
near the beginning of what I predict will be the tax code’s long 
antipoverty history, we have the opportunity, as the welfare rights 
advocates did, to shape the long-term futures of the programs we 
care about, to avoid the pitfalls of the direct-spending programs, 
and to use all of this work to make major changes not just to the 
workings of these programs, but to concepts foundational to the 
legal system. 
